LightGlue Remote Code Execution Vulnerability

A vulnerability in the LightGlue model loading path of huggingface/transformers version 5.2.0 allows an attacker-controlled model repository to execute arbitrary code during model initialization. The issue arises because the `trust_remote_code` parameter, intended to prevent remote code execution, is overridden by untrusted serialized configuration data in a nested code path. Specifically, when loading a LightGlue model using `AutoModel.from_pretrained()` with `trust_remote_code=False`, the `LightGlueConfig` reads the `trust_remote_code` value from the untrusted `config.json` file and propagates it into nested `AutoConfig.from_pretrained()` calls. This results in the execution of attacker-provided Python modules, even when the victim explicitly disables remote code execution. The vulnerability poses a high risk for environments such as API inference servers, research notebooks, CI/CD pipelines, and model evaluation workers, potentially leading to credential theft, lateral movement, or persistence/backdoor deployment.

What Happened

A vulnerability in the LightGlue model loading path of huggingface/transformers version 5.2.0 allows an attacker-controlled model repository to execute arbitrary code during model initialization. The issue arises because the `trust_remote_code` parameter, intended to prevent remote code execution, is overridden by untrusted serialized configuration data in a nested code path. Specifically, when loading a LightGlue model using `AutoModel.from_pretrained()` with `trust_remote_code=False`, the `LightGlueConfig` reads the `trust_remote_code` value from the untrusted `config.json` file and propagates it into nested `AutoConfig.from_pretrained()` calls. This results in the execution of attacker-provided Python modules, even when the victim explicitly disables remote code execution. The vulnerability poses a high risk for environments such as API inference servers, research notebooks, CI/CD pipelines, and model evaluation workers, potentially leading to credential theft, lateral movement, or persistence/backdoor deployment.

Why This Matters

The evidence matters to defenders using LightGlue because it could let an attacker run code in affected environments.

Recommended Action

Confirm whether Path is present in your environment and review vendor guidance for this report. Apply available patches or mitigations if your deployment matches the described conditions.

Exposure

Exposure reason: This incident does not currently match a technology in My Interests.

Exploitation status: DEMONSTRATED

Primary entities:

Timeline

• Incident first seen
  Jun 03, 2026 21:00

  BugSkan first recorded this incident.

• huggingface/transformers: Arbitrary Code Execution During Model Initialization in the LightGlue Model Loading Path
  Jun 03, 2026 21:00

  GitHub Advisory Database · Vulnerability

Sources

Related Incidents

Other BugSkan incidents that share identifiers, products, or vendors with this report.

My Interests Match