Last seen September 17, 2026

LiteLLM Security Incident

### Summary A server-side request forgery in LiteLLM Proxy lets an authenticated caller redirect the proxy's outbound request to a host of their choosing by smuggling an `api_base` inside the `user_config` request body, bypassing the existing parameter guard. ### Details LiteLLM Proxy validates request bodies with `is_request_body_safe`, which blocks the `api_base` and `base_url` parameters but does not cover `user_config`. The `user_config` object is used to build the outbound router for a request, so a caller can place an `api_base` inside it and reach an arbitrary host. The guard only inspected the two top-level keys, so the same `api_base` nested inside `user_config` was never checked. Exploitation requires a valid virtual key. ### Impact An authenticated caller can make the proxy issue server-side requests to internal or external hosts of their choosing, reaching endpoints the caller cannot otherwise access. ### Affected / Patched Affected: `

Technical Severity
Low severity
Lifecycle Status

NEW

What Happened

### Summary A server-side request forgery in LiteLLM Proxy lets an authenticated caller redirect the proxy's outbound request to a host of their choosing by smuggling an `api_base` inside the `user_config` request body, bypassing the existing parameter guard. ### Details LiteLLM Proxy validates request bodies with `is_request_body_safe`, which blocks the `api_base` and `base_url` parameters but does not cover `user_config`. The `user_config` object is used to build the outbound router for a request, so a caller can place an `api_base` inside it and reach an arbitrary host. The guard only inspected the two top-level keys, so the same `api_base` nested inside `user_config` was never checked. Exploitation requires a valid virtual key. ### Impact An authenticated caller can make the proxy issue server-side requests to internal or external hosts of their choosing, reaching endpoints the caller cannot otherwise access. ### Affected / Patched Affected: `

Why This Matters

Current evidence identifies a security issue involving LiteLLM Proxy, but does not yet support a more specific impact claim.

Recommended Action

### Affected / Patched Affected: `<= 1.83.8` Patched: `1.83.9` ### Remediation Upgrade to 1.83.9 or later (released 2026-04-17). Confirm whether LiteLLM Proxy is present in your environment and review the affected configuration.

Exposure

My Interests Exposure

Exposure unknown

Recommended Response
Last Seen

Sep 17, 2026 20:21

Exposure reason: This incident does not currently match a technology in My Interests.

Exploitation status: UNKNOWN

Primary entities:

litellmvulnerabilityLiteLLM ProxyBerriAI/litellmreleased

Timeline

  • Incident first seen
    Sep 17, 2026 20:21

    BugSkan first recorded this incident.

  • LiteLLM Proxy has server-side request forgery via the `user_config` request parameter
    Sep 17, 2026 20:21

    GitHub Advisory Database · Research

Sources

LiteLLM Proxy has server-side request forgery via the `user_config` request parameter

GitHub Advisory Database · Sep 17, 2026 20:21

### Summary A server-side request forgery in LiteLLM Proxy lets an authenticated caller redirect the proxy's outbound request to a host of their choosing by smuggling an `api_base` inside the `user_config` request body, bypassing the existing parameter guard. ### Details LiteLLM Proxy validates request bodies with `is_request_body_safe`, which blocks the `api_base` and `base_url` parameters but does not cover `user_config`. The `user_config` object is used to build the outbound router for a request, so a caller can place an `api_base` inside it and reach an arbitrary host. The guard only inspected the two top-level keys, so the same `api_base` nested inside `user_config` was never checked. Exploitation requires a valid virtual key. ### Impact An authenticated caller can make the proxy issue server-side requests to internal or external hosts of their choosing, reaching endpoints the caller cannot otherwise access. ### Affected / Patched Affected: `

Open publisher source

My Interests Match

Want personalized relevance?

Create an account to see which incidents overlap with your interests.

← Back to incident intelligence